

# A Yosys plugin for logic locking

Gabriel Gouvine – Coloquinte

LIP6

[gabriel.gouvine\\_moosic@m4x.org](mailto:gabriel.gouvine_moosic@m4x.org)


July 11, 2023



# EDA Projects


Coloquinte: Coriolis placement tool

Moosic: This presentation




# Supply-chain security for integrated circuits

Most circuit conception is fabless




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


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


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
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
How?

## Logic locking example





# Logic locking example



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Add logic that doesn't work without the right key

Simple method: Xor/Xnor gate insertion

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Can we attack it?

## Guessing the key: structural approaches

By default, keys are easy to find:

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
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
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ML attacks may still break those



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
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# Finding the key: SAT attack

Expected behaviour + logic circuit  
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Defense:

- ▶ More complex locking
- ▶ Better choice of locked signals
- ▶ Derived keys (crypto...)





## What makes a good logic locking?

Hard to guess the key

Disrupts circuit functionality

Mixed with the logic

# Metrics

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Output corruption: the wrong key changes many output values

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Pairwise security: key bits cannot be silenced individually

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Easy to install and integrate



## Plugin functionalities

Xor- and Mux- based logic locking

Automation of Xor-based logic locking (metrics)

Design space exploration (area vs security)

Not included

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Key handling left to the user

- ▶ Too HW-dependent (memory, boot, scan-chain...)
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Only flat modules

## In practice

Number of signals to lock

Number of test vectors

Metrics

Design space exploration?


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```
yosys> logic_locking -max-percent 5 -nb-test-vectors 64 -target corruption
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4. Executing LOGIC\_LOCKING pass.

Running logic locking with 64 test vectors, target 5.0% (10 cells out of 203).

Running corruption optimization with 101 unique nodes out of 203.

Locking solution with 10 locked wires, 49.80% corruption cover and 52.34% corruption rate.

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
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## Next steps

Connect with users:

Research: metrics implementation and evaluation

# Thank you

<https://github.com/Coloquinte/moosic-yosys-plugin>

